

9/11 truthers and conspiracy theorists of every variety' all having displayed 'a fierce disregard for factual evidence that contradicted their beliefs', a disregard reinforced by 'Fox News and talk radio, and by online echo chambers'. Trump, the author believes, is no Big Brother or even a throwback to the 1930s, but has far more in common with Buzz Windrip, 'the oafish populist' in Sinclair Lewis's *It Can't Happen Here*, or Joseph McCarthy. Nonetheless, Lynskey believes Trump has 'precedents in Orwell's writing', including the cries directed against Hillary Clinton of 'Lock her up!' at Trump's election rallies in 2016 being strongly reminiscent of the Two Minutes' Hate.

In one of the many intriguing details which litter the book, including Vladimir Putin's interest in the notion of Eurasia, Lynskey notes that Eric Blair almost took the *nom de plume* 'H. Lewis All-ways' instead of George Orwell, and notes that Allwaysian would not 'have been a graceful adjective'. This elegantly written book ought, however, to be read by anyone who has used, or abused, the word Orwellian.

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Why obey?

PAUL SAGAR

On Political Obligation, by Judith Shklar, edited and with an introduction by Samantha Ashenden and Andreas Hess. Yale University Press. 234 pp. £35

Following her sudden and early death in 1992, Judith N. Shklar (she was only sixty-four) was widely mourned by political theorists as a major loss to the field. A native of Riga, her Jewish family fled Europe when she was a child, and eventually settled in Canada in 1941. Shklar's outstanding academic brilliance saw her become the first woman tenured to Harvard's Department of Government, and she was the author of eight books by the time she died, most famously *Ordinary Vices* (1984). However, and despite widespread recognition amongst specialists, during her lifetime she never

achieved the impact of her Harvard colleague John Rawls in the field of contemporary political philosophy, nor the influence attained by leading lights of the previous generation of European *émigré* political thinkers such as Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt and Friedrich Hayek. Nonetheless, her reputation since her death has steadily grown as subsequent generations turn to her writings for insights which, whilst having taken time to gain wider appreciation, are increasingly recognised as being major contributions to twentieth century political theory.

It is therefore most welcome to have in print some of Shklar's final thoughts on one of the most enduring—and difficult—questions in political philosophy: on what grounds, if any, individuals should be expected to endorse and obey power, most particularly when the moral legitimacy of that power is brought into question. Assembled here are the surviving notes and texts of a twenty-three lecture course Shklar gave in Harvard shortly before her death, and which demonstrate clear continuity with the thinking around her final published books *The Faces of Injustice* (1990) and *American Citizenship* (1991). But they also show that she was thinking about much that was new, starting to pick out various paths towards what would probably have been another a book. It is a great loss that such a project was never brought to fruition, but the 200-odd pages of collected materials presented here help to indicate where Shklar was going, and prompt much to think about in turn.

It is remarkable just how demanding the course that Shklar taught must have been for its undergraduate participants. Her material ranges across not just the obvious 'canonical' texts in political theory—Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and so on—but a great deal besides. Thus, we start with a consideration of what differentiated two otherwise highly similar upper-middle class, protestant, mid-twentieth century Germans—Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Ernst von Weizsäcker—such that one ended up loyally serving Hitler, whilst the other was executed in a concentration camp for attempted resistance. (Shklar's answer is that the imperative of conscience weighed differently with each man; this sets up a leitmotif of much of the subsequent

course.) But students were also expected to engage in close readings of Sophocles' *Antigone* and Shakespeare's *Richard II*, whilst in other weeks, to consider the imperatives of obligation in the context of a Christianised world-view before and after rulers themselves became Christian, as well as the differences between civil disobedience in the nineteenth *vs.* twentieth centuries, and what makes conscientious objection a distinct philosophical issue. Augustine, Hegel, Martin Luther King, Thoreau, and many others get a look-in along the way, and the importance of religion lurks throughout in the background. Shklar's teaching in this regard reflected her published work: she took history seriously, used political thinkers (in all guises) to further her own ideas, and employed the past to interrogate the present. The editors note that few students are recorded as receiving high grades for this class. It's not hard to see why.

Included also is the text of a lecture, 'Conscience and Liberty', that Shklar gave at Berkeley in 1990. This is a welcome addition, helpfully situated as preface to the Harvard course materials, indicating one of the innovative lines of thinking that Shklar was developing, namely, that individual moral conscience must emerge as if not quite the lynchpin, then at least a crucially important component, of what getting to grips with the full complexity of political obligation must involve. Shklar thus shifts our attention away from standard philosophical preoccupations with rights and duties, towards an emphasis on the lived psychological complexity faced by those making real-world decisions as to where their loyalties lie. In the Berkeley lecture, Shklar comes at matters from the perspective of liberty and offers a challenge to Isaiah Berlin's championing of 'negative' over 'positive', insisting that the latter must matter in the context of living amidst severe injustice. In particular, that if one is part of a system of injustice—her example is American chattel slavery—then even if one personally enjoys negative liberty in not being interfered with by other agents, insofar as one's moral conscience is properly functioning, one will be rendered *internally* unfree by the knowledge of one's complicity in a wider system of injustice. From this perspective, securing non-interference from

other agents will not be enough to secure liberty, because liberty is in part a matter of being at ease with one's own conscience.

This line of thinking is continued in Shklar's Harvard lecture course, where we get fascinating glimpses into what she might, in time, have made of it. For example, in Shklar's reading, it is the invention of a moral conscience which really explains Socrates' dilemma in the *Crito*, and helps account for why that dialogue's surface arguments are so unconvincing; Plato was struggling to articulate something that nobody had articulated before. It is also why the question of political obligation becomes especially fraught when the Christian faith—with its prioritising of conscience and one's relationship to God—moves from being a religion of the subjugated, to that of emperors. It is also—intriguingly—why she suggests that when the age of ideologies took over Europe in the nineteenth century, the question of political obligation faded from the West everywhere except America. In Europe, the individual conscience could be safely aligned with the question of loyalty—not to the state, but to whichever 'ism' one's politics in that period conformed to. But in America, where ideology did not take hold so firmly, and yet the monstrosity of slavery had eventually to be confronted, things were different. This leads Shklar to suggest that civil disobedience and conscientious objection are primarily American phenomena that fully make sense only in an American context.

These are ultimately, and necessarily, only hints—the lecture material contains possibilities rather than worked out positions. Yet it seems, to me at least, undeniable that Shklar was on to something important when she finished by telling her students that

the idea of obligation creates trains of thought that take your mind off the main issues of politics. Factions, parties, class war, coups, juntas, conspiracies to seize power, and, of course foreign war are the real political issues. Obligation interferes with clear thinking about them. Loyalty, with its emotional component, may be even worse, and friendship especially is a danger.

'Thinking clearly' about politics is disrupted by the fact that we *necessarily* experience politics through prisms of obligation, loyalty,

and friendship. Shklar's point being, I take it, that it is therefore inevitable that our thinking on these matters becomes unclear. Hence, in significant part, why both the study and the practice of politics prove so persistently fraught and complex.

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The horrors of the hostile environment

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The Windrush Betrayal. Exposing the Hostile Environment, by Amelia Gentleman. Faber & Faber. 384 pp. £18.99

It was Saturday evening and the four of us were chatting about holidays after a pleasant meal. Lorna casually mentioned that her dad very much wanted to visit Italy but he didn't have a passport. 'What's the problem?', I asked. Her dad had come from Jamaica with a British passport in 1960 as a young adult. He had worked on the buses all his life, but at some stage he lost the passport. 'He's afraid applying for a replacement would draw attention to himself. We've discussed it with solicitors and agreed it's best just to leave it.'

Amelia Gentleman's *The Windrush Betrayal. Exposing the Hostile Environment* is full of the stories of those who weren't in a position to 'just leave it'. In consequence, they had their lives shattered by the brutal and heartless implementation of the government's 'hostile environment' policy designed drastically to reduce the number of immigrants in the UK. The stories mainly concern those who arrived as children and young adults from British colonies in the West Indies during the 1950s and 1960s. They came as full British citizens, but their status altered as a consequence of various immigration acts. As the Cameron coalition government sought to cut immigration into the UK to 'tens of thousands' they deliberately created 'a hostile environment' for those they considered illegal immigrants. These were people like Paulette who worked as a cook, who initially came to the attention of the Home Office when applying for a passport to visit her ailing mother back in

Jamaica. This cohort from the Caribbean increasingly found themselves trapped in a bureaucratic nightmare, being asked to prove that they had a right to be in the UK, even when they had lived and worked here for decades.

Gentleman is an investigative journalist for *The Guardian* and winner of the 2012 Orwell Prize for journalism. The book recounts the initial stories that she reported on and the scant political impact they had, but how gradually the momentum built as more cases came to light and she and her newspaper realised that the 'hostile environment' policy was seeing elderly, black West Indians as an easy target. As a direct result of *The Guardian's* reporting, during spring 2018 the political impact grew; the Labour opposition made effective interventions; and the Home Office was forced to backtrack and eventually admit the errors it had made. In the process, Home Secretary, Amber Rudd, was forced to resign.

This is a riveting and, at times, harrowing read. Gentleman uses the individual stories to devastating effect. The approach gives full voice to the drama of people's stories. She notes in her conclusions that 'human interest stories' are often disparaged within her profession. But there is no doubting their effectiveness here. These straightforward accounts of people losing their jobs, their housing, their access to health and hospital services because they didn't have a passport or couldn't show official evidence of residence speak directly to the mayhem wrought on long-serving British citizens by the Home Office (HO). She interweaves these stories with chapters on the history of postwar migration from the West Indies, the broader political context of the government's policy and little cameos such as a visit to the HO Immigration Centre in Croydon.

Gentleman explains the difficulties that many of the Windrush generation had in providing the extensive documentation that the HO demanded. How many of us keep the type of records the HO was asking for, going back decades, she wonders. These were working people who during the course of their lives moved, lost documents, suffered family break-ups, and so on. They led complicated lives, a phrase she wryly uses to describe her own domestic situation, married