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REVIEW ARTICLE

From Cicero to the science of man

From moral theology to moral philosophy: Cicero and visions of humanity from Locke to Hume, by Tim Stuart-Buttle, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019, 288 pp., £55 (hardcover), ISBN-13: 9780198835585

In this rigorous, persuasive, and highly accomplished book, Tim Stuart-Buttle sets out to uncover and bring to the fore a crucial but neglected aspect of the history of moral thought in Britain from John Locke to David Hume: the evolution of a fully secular moral philosophy which came to both separate itself from, and in turn repudiate, the moral theology from which it was born. Marshalling a dazzling array of thinkers and sources, which are brought to bear in an impressively focused and unified historical narrative, this monograph constitutes one of the major achievements of recent intellectual history, and provides a significant advance in our understanding of early modern moral philosophy.

In a long, ambitious, and successful opening chapter, Stuart-Buttle offers a systematic reconstruction and overview of Locke's moral philosophy. Whereas this is often taken by commentators to be something of an embarrassment when compared to the philosophical sophistication of Locke's epistemological thought, Stuart-Buttle demonstrates that the view of Locke as a relatively weak moral thinker is quite seriously wrong. Through careful reconstruction of Locke's moral thought across the span of his intellectual career – covering in detail the *Essays on the Law of Nature*, his engagement with the French Jansenists, the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, the two *Treatises* on government, and the *Reasonableness of Christianity* – Stuart-Buttle shows how Locke was engaged in a complex and ambitious long-running attempt to delineate, evaluate, and synthesize a dizzying number of competing considerations. These included the need to respond to the emergence of modern protestant natural law theory in the works of Grotius; Hobbes's radical reconfiguration of morality as ordered around a denial of natural human sociability and an emphasis on morality as a function of the law of nature to seek self-preservation; and serious engagement with Augustinian thought on the socially-embedded nature of morality understood as the performance of social roles in the gaze of others, but which might (at least under the right circumstances) be conducive to correct moral functioning even if this was not the primary motivation of agents themselves. Most important of all, however, was the question of how to integrate these considerations with what Locke took as the baseline truth of morality: that natural law, given by God, provided the final site of validity for what is right and wrong. Furthermore, Locke held, this truth was itself (at least in principle) demonstrable through reason, and yet in the absence of that demonstration, the truth of it had nonetheless been made available to us via the teachings of Christ as contained in the Gospels. It was this myriad and not obviously harmonious set of ideas that Locke set out, over many years, to reconcile.

Central to Stuart-Buttle's reconstruction is the role that Cicero played in the development and refinement of Locke's moral thought. As Stuart-Buttle notes, however, the central presence and persistence of Cicero here borders on the paradoxical. In the first place, Locke was largely contemptuous of ancient moral philosophy, which he saw as having failed to understand the fundamentally binding characteristic of natural law, and hence the crucial normative force of any kind of morality worth the name (the Stoics and Aristotelians, in this regard, drawing particular ire due to their preoccupation with the essentially self-regarding concerns of achieving *eudaimonia* or *ataraxia*). Cicero was of course an ancient, but Locke read him (Stuart-Buttle convincingly shows) as an academic sceptic rather than simply a Stoic, one who was helpful precisely in showing the weaknesses and mistakes of many of the Hellenistic schools. Furthermore, Cicero was important to Locke because he showed

how far properly-conducted philosophy might get to uncovering the truth, albeit despite the fact that short of the revelation provided by the Gospel it could never be enough by itself. This point was important because Locke wanted his readers to understand how far from the moral truth of God's natural law most contemporary Christian theologians and philosophers had strayed. Early modern Europe's track record of schism, disputation, and ultimately violent religious bloodshed, ensured that much of what had recently gone under the name of morality (and moral philosophy) was a good deal worse than what Cicero, a heathen, had managed to achieve.

Locke famously claimed that the truths of natural law – and hence of their independent veridical status, and thus binding normative necessity – were in principle capable of demonstration. He also notoriously failed to ever even attempt to provide that demonstration. But as Stuart-Buttle helps us to see, it is a mistake to therefore posit Locke as having strayed into some sort of embarrassing philosophical failure. Locke was clear that if hoping to provide such a demonstration, 'what was required was a Newton of the moral sciences' (p. 69). Yet he never claimed to *be* that Newton. On the contrary, he took himself to have proved a more fundamental truth: that for those of us who are not Newtonian geniuses, what we could nonetheless determine is that the Gospels provided us with enough to live morally, and that *if* the political laws and social conventions regarding conduct as performed in the eyes of others were properly calibrated in a given society, most of us could achieve correct moral living even without actually knowing the content of natural law directly from first principles. Rather than a broken-backed moral philosophy that fell apart under the pressure of Locke's insistence that moral truth was demonstrable, Stuart-Buttle's Locke emerges as urging that moral philosophy alone is precisely not where we should be focusing our intellectual energies, to the exclusion of what for him was also fundamental and inseparable: the role of moral theology, and the complex way that God's moral law could come to be successfully instantiated in this world. If a heathen thinker like Cicero – who nonetheless came to grasp the truth of God's existence, of the immortality of the soul, and of the importance of social conduct for living correctly – could get as far as he had, there was little excuse for those who now possessed the blessings of the Gospel to not get a good deal further.

Stuart-Buttle's opening chapter is thus a veritable tour de force in terms of intellectual reconstruction and interpretative revision, remaining remarkably readable throughout given the dense and complex nature of the multiple debates and texts he is operating with. It also provides the foundation for the historical story Stuart-Buttle tells about the subsequent development of moral philosophy in Britain over the next three generations.

In his second chapter, Stuart-Buttle turns to examine Anthony Ashley-Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, who was himself tutored by Locke as a boy and considered him a personal friend, and even quasi-father figure. Yet against the long-established view put forward by Lawrence Klein¹ – that Shaftesbury's moral philosophy was essentially an apology for the polite society of his day – Stuart-Buttle radically reverses the assessment, presenting Shaftesbury as instead a ferocious critic of modernity. The genesis of that criticism, however, was Shaftesbury's sustained and wholesale repudiation of Locke.

This has tended to be missed, Stuart-Buttle shows, because Shaftesbury kept his explicit disagreements with Locke out of his published work, and in his private notebooks. But what we find there is a violent and sustained reaction against every aspect of Locke's moral philosophy. On Shaftesbury's outlook it was intolerable to suppose that morality had its foundation in *sanctions* as issued by a divine punisher – this would make us no better than chained tigers, or monkeys cowed by the whip. Likewise, he was deeply suspicious of Locke's openness to the idea that socially-inculcated mechanisms of praise and blame could function as proxies for, or staging posts along the way to, proper ethical conduct. Whilst such devices might keep the massed ranks of the vulgar in line as mechanisms of social cohesion (Shaftesbury was, undeniably, an appalling snob), they could have

¹Lawrence Klein, *Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness: Moral Discourse and Cultural Politics in Early Eighteenth-Century England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

no place in genuinely normative behaviour. Most importantly of all, Shaftesbury rejected wholesale Locke's two fundamental tenets: the 'reasonableness' (i.e. rational validity and demonstrability) of Christianity, and the claim that access to moral truth was readily available through the Gospels.

The relationship between true moral philosophy and Christian moral theology was antagonistic, rather than harmonious as in Locke's account. For Shaftesbury, all revealed religions (not least Christianity) were impositions and subverted virtue. Their most 'corrupt' professors, such as Hobbes and Locke, merely served to reveal this fact most clearly. (p. 105)

In response Shaftesbury inverted Locke's position, presenting a mirror-image counterblast: it was the ancient Hellenistic schools that had made the most progress to seeing morality as part of the appreciation of a teleological harmonious order, and it was to the Stoics in particular that we must look for guidance, whilst Locke's appropriation of Cicero served only to obscure and mutilate what was properly to be learned from ancient sources. Christianity and moral theology had *corrupted* morality under European modernity, and were a poison that needed to be drained. Shaftesbury's moral thought was, as a result, anything but an apology for the polite Christian commercial modernity of his day. It was, instead, a damning condemnation of his age.

This leads Stuart-Buttle to offer a striking further re-appraisal: that it is Bernard Mandeville – Shaftesbury's arch, and most vociferous, critic – who more closely fits the role of apologist for polite society and modern commercial conditions. And this is to some extent no surprise on Stuart-Buttle's reading, for Mandeville deliberately set himself up – especially in his later and more sophisticated moral thought from the late 1720s onwards – as a direct opponent of Shaftesbury's anti-Christian, stoic-infused, moral philosophy. In the process, Mandeville returned to Locke's emphasis on mechanisms of shame and blame in the gaze of peers as crucial to understanding quotidian ethical behaviour. Yet whilst Mandeville's earliest work – the verse poem *The Grumbling Hive*, and the first edition of the *Fable of the Bees* that grew out of it – may have been primarily a recasting of French Augustinian thought for an English audience, Stuart-Buttle shows that after this Mandeville went much further in the development of a sophisticated moral philosophy of his own, one that was thoroughly conditioned by a sustained rejection of Shaftesbury.

Yet Mandeville also jettisoned Locke's hope that reason and the Gospels could undergird social conventions with an immutable normative validity. With the rare exception of the regenerate few who happened to be privileged by God's grace, fallen men could at best achieve only a simulacrum of virtue in the form of complex systems of social interaction calibrated around the central psychological fact of human pride (later refined into a distinction between 'self-love' and 'self-liking'), the driving and most essential factor in explaining the behaviour of creatures who were, at root, necessarily and irreducibly self-regarding in their motivations. Rejecting appeal to anything but direct revealed religion as capable of securing genuine normativity, Mandeville struck out firmly in a direction Locke would have been horrified by. But he thus found himself faced with a conundrum. How to explain the idea of moral *obligation* – of binding normative requirements – if quotidian morality is in reality a series of complex social performances evolved over time to peacefully satiate the pride of selfish status competitors, but nothing more? Here Mandeville's later work – including *The Fable of the Bees, Volume 2, A Letter to Dion*, and *An Enquiry into the Origin of Honour and the Usefulness of Christianity in War* – made recourse to a theory of extensive self-deception, and in its final form posited a complex historical story of how domineering priest-craft, the emergence of notions of military honour, and the opulence associated with thriving commercial societies, had eventually inculcated the socially useful, but fundamentally specious, notion of moral obligation into everyday moral thought. The result was that whilst Mandeville's mature work moved ever further away from the simplistic view that his early writing was famous for – that morality was an invention of skilful politicians who purposefully tricked the rest of humanity into adopting counterfeit virtue as a mechanism of social control – towards a vastly more complex, naturalistic account, he nonetheless maintained, and indeed if anything deepened, a profound scepticism that ordinary human moral practices could be possessed of genuine normative legitimacy:

Strikingly, Mandeville offered an explanation of the development of society, and of the moral personality within it, which historicized and instrumentalized both Shaftesbury's Stoic moral philosophy and Locke's Christian moral theology. Neither was true or adequate, but both Stoicism's flattery of human pride and Christianity's appeal to shame were important stages in the history of the cultivation of the self-liking upon which depended men's sense of moral obligation. Honour, however, had finally achieved what Stoic and Christian 'Virtue' could not. (p. 147)

This, however, means Stuart-Buttle somewhat mis-states his own case as précised at the close of Chapter 2. For on his own reading in Chapter 3, Stuart-Buttle's Mandeville isn't in fact an apologist for commercial modernity at all, but rather – albeit in rather different form – another severe moral critic. The hidden truth of commercial opulence (the long-run outgrowth of artificial sociability and counterfeit morality) was, according to Mandeville, the normative vacuity of the entire edifice – a theme he consistently maintained, albeit in modified and evolving form, from his earliest writings to his last. (An issue here is that Stuart-Buttle seems to read Mandeville as responding to the actual views of Shaftesbury, i.e. those that Stuart-Buttle has here reconstructed. But as Mandeville lacked access to Shaftesbury's private reflections, and worked in response to the published philosophy alone, he was responding to the sanitized and punch-pulling public version, and thus not to what Shaftesbury really thought.) This, however, is a relatively minor correction to Stuart-Buttle's presentation, and one I take to anyway be true to the more fundamental case he puts forward in terms of reading Mandeville as effecting a sophisticated response to the intellectual legacies inherited from Locke and Shaftesbury. In any case, the chapter on Mandeville is again an impressive and persuasive reading of a complex thinker's developing oeuvre in the round, one that properly treats supposedly 'minor' works with the attention they deserve, and in the process demonstrates that the still standard assumption that it is really only *The Fable of the Bees, Volume 1* and some select passages of *Volume 2*, that deserve sustained scholarly attention, is simply wrong. Stuart-Buttle shows that to really understand Mandeville, both his intellectual context – most especially the Locke-Shaftesbury nexus – and the development of his ideas into the 1730s, need to be given full attention.

Stuart-Buttle's fourth chapter considers the comparatively lesser-known heterodox Protestant theologian Conyers Middleton, and represents something of a break in his historical story of moral-philosophical confrontations over the value of the ancient sects, insofar as Middleton does not directly partake in the dialectic initiated by Shaftesbury and continued by Mandeville. Yet the chapter's inclusion is nonetheless justified in light of Middleton's wrestling with the problem that Locke had been perturbed by – 'the relationship between reason and revelation, the useful and the true, and of how (or whether) they might be reconciled' (p. 160) – and the sustained use Middleton made of Cicero to establish a 'Christian humanism', derived from Erasmus but 'pushed to its sceptical limits' (p. 173). The result was that Middleton took to an extreme the aspiration for the sort of synthesis Locke had envisioned between Cicero and the Gospels:

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, for Middleton, Cicero's philosophy and that of Christ were equally divine, but that the former took precedence. Only by first submitting to the pains and application demanded by academic scepticism—that is, by philosophizing properly—might the value of the Gospels be identified. Their meaning and significance were, however, to all intents and purposes confined within parameters established by Cicero. (p. 178)

Stuart-Buttle's final chapter returns to his main story of the unfolding of moral philosophy in the wake of Locke, with a rich and detailed treatment of Hume. Here we reach – as indicated by the book's title – the end-point of a development of moral philosophy that became fully secular. Furthermore, however, Hume's moral philosophy represented a *vindication* of naturalistically explained morality – thus avoiding, and indeed refuting, the Augustinian-Mandevillian implication that a morality constructed from the materials of human psychology alone must be lacking in genuine normativity because at base be a kind of fraud. This is a story that has been told before – notably by E.J. Hundert and John Robertson² – but

²E.J. Hundert, *The Enlightenment's Fable: Bernard Mandeville and the Discovery of Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), Chapter 2; John Robertson, *The Case for the Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples 1680–1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Chapter 6.

Stuart-Buttle tells it in more depth, and at a superior level of technical sophistication and accuracy. He also goes further, and shows how it was central to Hume's project to refute the claim that genuine morality required the pursuit of a *summon bonum*. Not only was this simply not true, Hume argued, but in doing so he defanged the claim that only religion (perhaps in conjunction with Hellenistic ideas of *eudaimonia* or *ataraxia*) could provide the final highest good that could make morality what it purported to be.

Central to Stuart-Buttle's reading of Hume, however, is the importance he attributes to Cicero in both the development, and theoretical content, of Hume's ideas. Although Hume's youthful fondness for Cicero is well known (something which long predated his publishing of the *Treatise of Human Nature* at a precocious 27), the extent to which Hume was seriously influenced by Cicero's ideas has, strikingly, never previously been studied in detail. Stuart-Buttle shows that this has been a major oversight. Particularly successful in this regard is his demonstration of the extent and power of Hume's protracted assault upon religion, conducted more or less implicitly in his moral philosophy (via acts of omission or severe deflation regarding the role of religion in explaining moral practice), and far more explicitly in *The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, the *Natural History of Religion*, the *History of England*. As Stuart-Buttle shows, Hume not only conceived himself as a sort of Ciceronian academic sceptic for a Christian age, but marshalled Cicero's own arguments (albeit in refined and improved form, suitably adapted for an age of monotheism) in ways that blew apart the pretensions of the theologians. In the process he also dealt heavy blows to Locke and Middleton's claims that Cicero's moral philosophy was uniquely compatible with the Gospels. On the contrary, Hume insisted, Cicero showed the utterly *superfluous* nature of Christianity when it came to ethical living. Rather than being the necessary grounding of a healthy morality, religion (all of it, but especially Christianity) was at best a useless ornament, and at worst a source of individual moral degradation, intellectual confusion, and social conflict. Still, this didn't mean religion had to be *abolished*, or that it would be at all sensible to try to get rid of it. Whilst Hume certainly hoped and believed that most aspects of Christianity would eventually die out of their own accord, until they did the more benign versions of it could easily be tolerated, and indeed from the perspective of social cohesion, it was better to let them be. 'So long as Christianity were constrained to play broadly the same role as the Roman religion in Cicero's day – subordinated to civil law, and not interfering with men's moral sentiments – it might be defended on Ciceronian grounds' (p. 219).

Whilst these sections of the chapter are highly persuasive, less convincing to my mind is Stuart-Buttle's insistence on the importance of Cicero to the development of Hume's own positive moral philosophy as first put forward in Books II and III of the *Treatise*, then refined (but not fundamentally altered) in the *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*. Stuart-Buttle goes so far as to claim that the latter work is 'quite consciously modelled' (p. 200) on Cicero's *De Officiis*, indeed is nothing less than Hume's 're-writing' (p. 219) of that text. This is a bold claim. At the very least, the *Enquiry* is not *only* that. And even if it is that, this may have much to do with the fact that Hume was recasting the philosophy of the *Treatise* in ways that he thought would both sell more copies, and be better understood and received than his first work, which he notoriously (and somewhat disingenuously) claimed had fallen 'dead-born from the press'. Insofar as Cicero was already popular with the reading public, doing something that looked like Cicero isn't therefore immediate proof that Hume's moral philosophy, in its technical specifics, is significantly Ciceronian.

Of course, and has been recognized in scholarship since at least James Moore's important article on the matter,³ Hume's insistence that morality is ultimately about what we find agreeable and/or useful to ourselves and/or others bares a certain similarity to Cicero's attempt to locate ethics in the balance between the *honestum* (the normatively good) and the *utile* (the useful). But how deep does the similarity go, really? Cicero was not a theorist of 'sympathy' (the lynchpin of Hume's moral philosophy), nor was he an empiricist wedded to the doctrine that all ideas are copied from our impressions (as Hume certainly was, at least when he penned the *Treatise*). But both of

³James Moore, 'Utility and Humanity: The Quest for the *Honestum* in Cicero, Hutcheson and Hume', *Utilitas* 14, no. 3 (2002): 365–86.

these features (amongst others) are indispensable undergirding aspects of Hume's 'science of man', the one that enabled him, finally, in the final part of Book III of the *Treatise*, to arrive at his conclusion about utility and agreeableness. Or to put the point a different way: there is a serious philosophical reason (it is not just an arbitrary quirk of history) why Hume, not Cicero, is widely regarded as the progenitor of sophisticated ethical subjectivism in the history of western philosophy, and why every philosophy undergraduate in the world is at some point required to read Hume, whilst virtually none read Cicero.

Stuart-Buttle might in reply point out that, as he details in the book, Hume reached for Cicero when attempting to placate Francis Hutcheson in the aftermath of the latter's violent reaction against Book III of the *Treatise* (which appears also to have motivated the older Professor at Glasgow to block Hume's appointment to a university post). Is Hume's insistence that he was really just saying what Cicero had already said not clear proof that Cicero was a major germ for Hume's moral thought? Not necessarily. For it is clear that Hutcheson badly misunderstood both the content, and especially the implications – which he took to be dangerously sceptical, and hence destructive to good morals – of Hume's arguments. (Whether this was due to philosophical inability, or the result of an apoplexy induced by the fact that Hume clearly accepted as true at least *some* of what Mandeville had put forward, whereas Hutcheson's intellectual lifework was an almost obsessive ongoing effort to refute everything that Mandeville had said, is not clear.) Faced with such violent non-comprehension, Hume's effort at placation needs to be read as at least in part tactical: the powerful older professor was in a moralistic frenzy, and the appeal to Cicero may have had more to do with trying to calm him down than being a straight indication of Hume's core philosophical debts. In an exchange where the older party was drastically outclassed in terms of intellectual ability, but may not have been fully aware that this was the case, and yet was in a position to seriously hamper the younger thinker's career prospects (as indeed he did), Hume's attempt to stay off the detail of argument, and instead present himself as doing what Cicero had already done, makes a lot of tactical sense (even though it failed). It may tell us less, however, about what any readings of Hume's ideas not afflicted by Hutchesonian apoplexy should conclude.

Lying in the background here is a complex 'methodological' (for want of a better word) point about how we go about doing the history of philosophy. In less capable versions of the more thoroughly contextualist kind of history of philosophy that Stuart-Buttle practises, there is sometimes a tendency to render every thinker as merely a collator of previous ideas, now put together in more or less interesting ways. Yet the reading of a past philosopher as a sort of collage artist can have the unfortunate effect of making historical figures into less than the sum of their parts. This can lead to readings that inappropriately deflate the significance of philosophical innovations, whilst missing the point that new ideas, after all, have to come from *somewhere*, and that ultimately means that someone has to have them. To be clear, Stuart-Buttle does not fall into the trap of making Hume less than the sum of his parts. His reading is powerful, plausible, and as regards religion especially, persuasive. Yet there is nonetheless a risk that his Ciceronian Hume becomes one from whom the sheer power and originality, as effected in his epochal contributions to moral philosophy, goes a little missing. Certainly, Hume read and learned from Cicero. But what makes him *Hume* is that he effected major advances in moral philosophy that ultimately cannot be traced back to anyone else. As a general point, I have no doubt that Stuart-Buttle would concur. The relevant question is thus a subtle one: where, exactly, do we draw the line on where the originality begins? Stuart-Buttle must be right that with Hume we can only begin to think about placing that line accurately once we have first reintegrated Cicero. My sense, however, is that once we follow him in doing that, the line nonetheless isn't quite where he implies it to be.

The complexity of this matter – marking perhaps my only disagreement of substance in a book running to nearly 300 pages – is itself, however, a mark of praise. My final comment is in turn not so much a criticism, but more of a lament – though one that may be revealing. For on a slightly different reading of the story Stuart-Buttle tells, the correct stopping place is not with Hume, but with his friend and intellectual successor, Adam Smith. For it is Smith who (at least to my mind) in the



Theory of Moral Sentiments finally closes the debate bequeathed by Locke, and forwarded via Shaftesbury and Mandeville, by improving Hume's philosophical framework with a more powerful account of our ethical sentiments and practices, that avoids the problems Hume's philosophy fell into, whilst decisively putting to rest the Mandevillean charge that secular morality is a fraud.⁴ Furthermore, religious concerns only ever appear in Smith's moral thought as ornamental additions to what is, in its core philosophical mechanics, a thoroughly secular addition to the science of man. (Stuart-Buttle has unfortunately been led astray by some unhelpful scholarship that erroneously posits Smith as endorsing a quasi-stoic deist providentialism; in fact, Smith was as committed to the project of secular naturalism as Hume was, although he packaged the project in a much more cautious and indirect manner.⁵) Smith does feature in Stuart-Buttle's epilogue, but I would have been intrigued to see what he made of Smith at the level of detail given over to the five thinkers that constitute his study (and which would, I think, have revealed to Stuart-Buttle that Smith was with Hume when it came to the wholesale replacement of moral theology with moral philosophy). But I would note also that Cicero was not a major influence on Smith, who mentions him on occasion, but only to leave him aside. In that sense, it is of course therefore entirely appropriate for Smith to play no part in Stuart-Buttle's Cicero-centred story. On the other hand, it perhaps also shows that the truer end-point for the story that Stuart-Buttle tells is one that not only confirms that the science of man ultimately yielded a moral philosophy entirely autonomous from moral theology, but that came also to operate just fine without Cicero as well. Given that 'No contemporary philosopher engaged more closely and sympathetically with Hume's moral philosophy than Adam Smith' (p. 226), the fact that Smith found so little in Cicero may tell us something important about what was ultimately doing the heavy lifting in Hume's moral philosophy, too.

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⁴On which see Paul Sagar, 'Beyond Sympathy: Smith's Rejection of Hume's Moral Theory', *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 25, no. 4 (2017): 681–705.

⁵For more accurate readings of Smith on religion see for example Colin Heydt, 'The Problem of Natural Religion in Smith's Moral Thought', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 78, no. 1 (2017): 73–94; Gavin Kennedy, 'The Hidden Adam Smith in his Alleged Theology', *Journal of the History of Economic Thought* 33, no. 1 (2011): 385–402.